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 Chapter 3 
 Individual Rights, Economic 
Transactions, and Recognition:  A Legal 
Approach to Social Economics 
 Stefano  Solari 
 Although markets are based on legal foundations and judiciary 
problems often concern economic issues, the twentieth century saw a 
progressive methodological divide between legal and economic stud-
ies. In particular, economic theory stands on quite simplistic legal 
concepts that contribute to hide some important issues at stake. This 
divide has not been reduced much by the development of the field of law 
and economics, which simply applies the economics method to legal 
issues. A necessarily more fruitful field of interaction between these 
perspectives is promised by social economics, which, since its begin-
ning, has adopted a more integrated and interdisciplinary approach, 
including the study of property rights and institutions. In particular, 
among the many issues debated in social economics, the theme of jus-
tice in economic exchanges over the course of history has stimulated 
much fruitful research that still deserves to be further developed. In 
this field of research, the study of the legal variables comes into direct 
interaction with economic reasoning. Consequently, categories used 
in the economic analysis should be harmonized with the legal frame-
work. On the other hand, the choice of the legal theory on which we 
develop social economy studies is crucial in determining what can and 
what cannot be seen in terms of pathologies in human interaction. 
 Modernity brought the idea of individual property rights as a com-
plex phenomenon. However, economics adopted a simplistic view 
of property as a fundamental institution, understating the complex 
interaction of different rights and obligations that frame the legal 
environment of economic processes with an insufficiently elaborated 
tool. Here, a more elaborate view of legal elements will be proposed 
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in order to analyze the interactions constituting exchanges. The legal 
perspective will be inspired by classical natural law, without neces-
sarily following the Aristotelian or Thomistic frameworks. The clas-
sical idea of objective good and of moral law as inspiration to human 
interaction through practical reasonableness is here read through the 
lens of more contemporary philosophical work. 1 This allows us to 
use ideal principles as an ethical reference while adopting a practical 
approach to social-economic concrete action according to the typi-
cal  ideal-realist perspective. This approach draws special attention to 
social law (in the sense of norms developed and accepted by a com-
munity) and opposes legal positivism. The organic view of society 
typical of classical natural law will be fitted to the contemporary idea 
of individual rights by simply accepting the latter as a partial analysis 
of legal relationships. On the other hand, the connection with social 
economics is made through the institutionalist framework, which 
maintains many aspects of the ancient organic view of the social fab-
ric. 2 Therefore, concepts of the classical tradition, including the ideal-
realist approach, are fitted into a transaction approach to be able to 
study the fairness of economic processes from a different perspective 
compared to the proceduralist one. 
 The starting point for my analysis is that “the members of a human 
society are bounded together by a network of rights and duties” deter-
mining a relational space. 3 In order to understand the role of the law 
in economic processes, a comparable relational approach to economic 
intercourses is needed. John Commons’s concept of transactions is 
an appropriate framework by which we can study economic and legal 
elements in a unitary view of human action. 4 Commons’s transac-
tion approach is able to frame the often cited relationships of conflict, 
mutuality, and order, and it can also include law and rights as part of 
the interrelationship. 
 Property Rights and the Law 
 The idea of individual rights was not part of classical political phi-
losophy and gradually emerged only from canonist studies in the late 
Middle Ages. 5 The individualism of modern political and economic 
thought isolated individuals from social relationships and endowed 
them with property rights, which were defined as “natural” in the 
sense of having priority over any other claim or law and thereby con-
stituting a defensive sphere of private autonomy. In the classical world, 
we could find concepts such as the law, the just thing, the right order 
of society, and right behavior, but no notion pointing to a “defensive” 
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relationship of the individual to political authority based on an indi-
vidual legal endowment. 6 Any right was defined to some obligation 
through a juridical relationship—which was part of a relational and 
organic view of the law. 
 The social philosophy of political liberalism shaped a political 
economy that incorporated the idea of individual right as individual 
endowment or a kind of stock. Property rights were conceived as a 
defensive principle to protect the individual sphere of liberty from 
the authority of the state. As a consequence, the relational principle 
that shaped ancient theories of the law and that led to the idea of 
 Ordo was lost to the advantage of a claim of individual autonomy 
and freedom. 7 Unfortunately, after modern natural law achieved the 
acknowledgment of individual control over property (to defend the 
individual from the claims of the sovereign), this idea of individual 
rights evolved in a view of society where property rights came before 
any other duty and, above all, neglected any obligation that the indi-
vidual has in relation to his community. 
 Moreover, property rights, which originally were intended to be 
an all-inclusive concept that in the view of Hobbes concerned our 
own life, body, family affections, and wealth, became a simple “stock-
package” pointing to the specific relationship between the individual 
and the property. 8 It came to consist in a right of exclusion that had 
to be defended by the state, functional to a conflict-ridden view of 
society. This perspective is still dominant in both libertarian views 
of society as well as liberal-progressive conceptions of the economy. 
Even those who argue in favor of the extension of individual rights 
into social and economic rights often conceive them as an individual 
stock and not as an organic interdependence of claims in society. 
 An example of this fact is the definition of basic rights by Henry 
Shue as “the minimum reasonable demands that everyone can place 
on the rest of humanity.” 9 Here the right is conceived as an open claim 
and not as a relationship between individuals. 10 The usual critique to 
this kind of conception is that, finding no specific obliged individual 
as a counterpart, it leaves to the state all charges of assuring its mini-
mal fulfillment. Therefore, due to the way rights are conceived, they 
are not easily transformed in “justiciable rights” and therefore the 
government has to assume the costs of fostering them. That, in turn, 
makes society very vertical and bureaucratic because the interaction 
between the claimants and those who actually supply the service is 
mediated by the state through public administration. 
 The problem in contemporary economics is that property rights are 
simply taken as objects of transactions and seen as an invariant stock. 
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Exchanges are not shaping or affecting rights; instead, they are sim-
ply transferring their ownership to other individuals. This theoriza-
tion is in many cases perfectly suited to economic studies. Therefore, 
these rights concern property and consist of a relationship between 
the individual A and the good G. That right-stock can be transferred 
from individual A to individual B and be subject to evaluation. The 
evaluation of a right-stock depends on subjective use value determin-
ing reservation prices and on the social evaluation given by relative 
scarcity determining the market price. But the nature and form of the 
right itself is not seen as changeable by economists. Moreover, indi-
vidual or social rights or any moral obligations are presumed neutral 
to the process of market evaluation, and similarly, wealth effects and 
externalities are excluded or regarded as “incidental.” Properties of 
the good as well as the good itself are therefore associated and seen as 
objective and simple in their unity, not affected by the context and by 
the personality of traders. The result is that we tend not to question 
the fairness of market prices. 
 This theoretical architecture may seem appropriate to describe 
exchanges involving relatively homogeneous commodities. But most 
transactions do not involve simple commodities but rather “services” 
of a heterogeneous nature. Most transactions in a service society 
involve the creation of value out of interpersonal relationships and 
activities in which the quality of the persons involved is crucial, such 
as labor relations or the consultancy of a tax advisor. In other cases, 
rights are sold that allow the access to some performance or informa-
tion, such as getting on the train or reading an e-book. In all these 
cases the coincidence of the good G and the property right connect-
ing A to G is a misleading way of explaining how transactions work. 
 The problems that a legal approach to social economics has to deal 
with are, first, the genesis and nature of individual property rights. 
Then, it has to deal with the relationship between property rights 
and other human and social rights as well as obligations and liberties. 
Finally, it must study the criterion to evaluate justice in exchanges—
that is to say, criteria for fair evaluation in relation to the nature of 
legal relationships. 
 Contemporary Conceptions of Rights and Justice 
 The theory of justice proposed by John Rawls had a major impact 
on economics and has become an important reference for liberal 
thought. 11 It interprets justice as a distributive problem and it jus-
tifies government reallocation of resources by a procedural logic. 
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However, this theory does not question the outcome markets’ out-
come based on an intrinsically fair process, but looks at only the 
resulting distribution of income. It assumes that fostering free mar-
kets assures efficiency with a side effect of bad distribution of income. 
That implies an external ethical point of view that is theorized as the 
“original position.” This theory totally neglects any problem con-
nected to commutative justice and the genesis of rights. Its critics 
have pointed out its contradictory materialism, but this is not our 
concern here. 12 
 The position of Ronald Dworkin’s work is relevant here. He is not 
a positivist and therefore he acknowledges the fundamental role of 
moral obligations in line with the classical approach, but at the same 
time he adopts an individualist perspective. 13 The interesting aspect 
of Dworkin’s approach is his idea of the  unity of value , that is to say, 
unity of moral and ethical values. 14 He argues that a well-working 
theory of justice is based on morals: in this view the law is not com-
peting with morals, but can be seen as a branch of political morals, 
which is a specific branch of the wider concept of personal morals. 
The latter, in turn, is a part of the conception of how to live well, or 
the ethics of dignity. 
 In this way, Dworkin interprets personal interest as framed by an 
ethical ideal. He admits that, today, the Greek view of unity of the 
two spheres of value (morals and interest) has survived in a degraded 
form. Greek ideals affirmed that the good life is something beyond 
the satisfaction of desires because it also involves caring for others. 
Modern political and economic philosophy abandoned the integrity 
of morals and ethics, instead conceiving interest and ethics as con-
flicting: morals in this case means subordination of personal interest 
to ethics. As a consequence, in Dworkin there is both a superior point 
of reference given by ethics and an ideal logic of derivation of law 
from morals. 
 Dworkin defines individual rights as something residual from col-
lective ends of society related to ethics. 15 Individual rights are there-
fore subordinated to collective ends; the definition of individual legal 
positions is not derived directly from interindividual relationships, 
but it is mediated by general ethical and political principles. He dis-
tinguishes  background rights , relative to society in general, from  insti-
tutional rights , relative to the effect of specific institutions. Moreover, 
he also distinguishes between arguments of principles and policy: a 
policy standard is an objective to be reached, such as an economic 
improvement, whereas a principle is a standard to be observed as fun-
damental requisite of justice and equity. Principles are not hard and 
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fast rules, but a general orienting device affecting the culture of a 
community. 
 Dworkin’s aim to rejoin rights with classic principles is partially 
successful because it allows us to interpret his theoretical work as a 
reinterpretation of the political community ( polis ) in present times. 
Nonetheless, it represents still an open-ended and vertical concep-
tion of rights as they are defined relative to the state, and they are 
not discussed in their genesis. Dworkin therefore bases his reasoning 
on a priority assigned to public law compared to private or social law. 
However, the idea of principles as field organizers and elements able 
to align behavior can have interesting application in a social-economic 
theory of economic transactions inspired to the classic tradition. 
 A Horizontal View of Rights: Recognition 
 The individualization and the verticalization of the idea of right, origi-
nating from a preferential relationship between the individual and the 
state, does not contribute much to the social-economic analysis. 16 In 
fact, since the beginning of social economics, a critique of this con-
ceptual architecture was conducted by those who—from Sismondi to 
the Jesuits—focused on the problem of social justice. The emphasis 
on the social economy inspired by the classical approach privileges 
social law and concrete legal relationships. Therefore, rights are justi-
fied not by abstract philosophical principles but by their actual accep-
tance by the involved individuals. On the one hand, we need abstract 
ideas of the good and of genuine humanity, and on the other, rights 
are concrete positions in actual relationships. 17 The justification of 
rights requires understanding the logical thread that connects the 
juridical elements framing economic interactions. 
 There are many precedents for this line of thinking in modern 
philosophy. Thomas Scanlon expressed a similar concern, although 
from a contractualist perspective, pointing out the need of require-
ments of  justifiability to others. 18 Oswald Hanfling similarly argues 
that rights belong to a language game that includes the exchange 
of reasons. 19 Contemporary contractualists as Alan Gewirth found 
justification of rights in purposeful human action, which is to say, in 
specific deliberations. 20 Historically, this has led to constitutionalism, 
but formal laws can be empty of practices; the problem is to explain 
actual rights operating in social relationships. Amartya Sen, from his 
applied perspective, affirmed that rights can be functional to posi-
tive freedoms. 21 But he could not explain the source of rights and, 
actually, rights and capabilities are two competing concepts in Sen’s 
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“a-juridical” system, which is based on the pragmatic idea of assur-
ing human capabilities in a nonrelational setting (a good theoretical 
system in itself but not related to our problem). 22 
 The approach followed here is classical in the sense that priority 
is given to moral law guiding effective individual action, framed by 
social customs and institutions. The basic idea is that, in social eco-
nomics, we should understand how actual, observed economic behav-
ior is affected by the social fabric. Therefore, priority is given to rules 
and rights as effectively perceived by acting people and not from an 
abstract general theoretical perspective. On the other hand, human 
behavior has to be studied in its social dimension, that is to say, from 
a relational perspective. 
 A similar approach characterized the ethical thought of Edmund 
Burke: the true law comes from moral customs diffused in a com-
munity. 23 He argued that the rules more apt to foster the well-being 
of a society emerge from the experience of that community; there-
fore, rights derive from actual customs and precede formal law. The 
approach presented here does not take this view as normative but 
as an applied theorizing perspective. Justification for rights can be 
shaped inside a practical view of social-economic interactions. 
 More specifically, this chapter contributes to a rediscovery of 
Hegel’s  Philosophy of Right and Rosmini’s ideas on the law for aspects 
affecting economics. 24 The main idea that these authors stressed is 
the fundamental act of  recognition on which any community is based. 
Recognition is the cognitive act by which each person acknowledges 
his human identity of another person, and is also the ground of the 
respect due to the other’s identity, including her specific living sphere 
(“property” in classical terms) that is at the ground of any juridical 
relationship. Rights are not valid by themselves or by metaphysical 
reasons, but because others have felt a natural obligation to recog-
nize them. A right, according to Rosmini, is in itself a moral entity 
that emerges in the relationship between personal freedom and moral 
law. 25 Therefore, in this view, the idea of duty logically precedes that 
of right (while remaining independent). 26 The rights of others that we 
recognize are obviously obligations that we are, directly or indirectly, 
willing to fulfill. 27 This aspect makes the juridical relationship funda-
mentally reciprocal and grounded in history. 28 
 In Hegel’s thought, reciprocal recognition, mediated by ideal 
juridical forms, is the foundation of property rights. 29 Property is 
generated in exchange by reciprocal agreements which include the 
recognition of property. The foundation of individual autonomy is 
the intersubjective recognition that our needs, beliefs, and capabilities 
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deserve to be fulfilled. It is based on a common moral principle that 
becomes embedded in practices, beliefs, and institutions. Exchange 
therefore includes two lines of communication, one concerning the 
reciprocal recognition of rights and the other based on prices. 
 This perspective is at the same time cognitive and behavioral. 
It asserts that rights are what we recognize to each other, and this 
recognition has an ethical aspect because we attach a dimension of 
“ought to be” on what we recognize to each other. At the same time, 
however, we do not have an ideal result to achieve: morals are based 
on abstract principles that we have to adapt to actual situations and 
not on ideal states to reach. The content of a right includes what his-
tory presents as actualizations of these relationships as mediated by 
(perhaps imperfectly) shared ideal values. So, there is a realist dimen-
sion in this framework of analysis that allows to understand exactly 
what are effective rights and obligations, and there is a moral dimen-
sion concerning the rights that we ought recognize to others accord-
ing to the ethical vision of the society that we would like to live in. 
This does not mean that we cannot define universal, natural, or fun-
damental rights, but this is an issue beyond this chapter. 
 Once we accept the factual-ethical dimension of rights, we can 
work out some specification on the exact architecture of juridical 
relationships involving individuals and the political authority. Here, 
many classifications of rights can be described, as that between posi-
tive rights (or entitlements) and negative rights (or freedoms), simi-
lar to Kantian perfect and imperfect duties. 30 In the case of positive 
rights, we should recognize (and be ready to pay for) the specific 
forms of collective action that are assigned to fulfill such rights. 
 Economic Transactions and the Legal Framework 
 According to Gianfranco Tusset, writing about Gustavo Del Vecchio 
(an Italian economist who developed a relational approach to economic 
exchanges), the relational approach to economic interactions can be 
traced back to the work of Friedrich von Hermann and to Henry 
Dunning Macleod. 31 Apparently, Hermann influenced the work of 
Eugen B ö hm-Bawerk, which directly inspired John Commons’s con-
ception of transactions. 32 The characteristic of the relational approach 
to exchanges is that it fundamentally involves legal variables, that is to 
say, rights, obligations, and rules. 
 Starting with his first work, Commons attempted to system-
atically connect juridical elements with economics. 33 In his  Legal 
Foundations of Capitalism , Commons elaborated a legal framework 
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to study transactions under the hypothesis that economic outcomes 
are fundamentally shaped by the institutional framework, and he 
adopted and slightly modified the legal theory of Wesley Hohfeld. 34 
In this perspective, the allocation of goods takes place in a juridi-
cal environment, where individuals act in a space defined by rights, 
duties, and working rules. Hohfeld’s framework is based on a three-
term relation (two persons and an act-description) giving birth to the 
following rights: 
 Right of A, corresponding to  duty of B 
 Privilege of A, corresponding to  no-right of B 
 Power of A, corresponding to  liability of B 
 Immunity of A, corresponding to  no-power of B 
 This relational scheme of legal elements was modified by Commons 
to shape his model of transactions. Actually, in Commons’s model, 
transactions always involve at least five actors: the two interacting indi-
viduals A and B, two nontransacting individuals C and D representing 
the opportunities not taken (or opportunity costs) and the adminis-
trative authority in charge of regulating economic processes. 35 
 Commons did not use the notion of preferences but rather the 
simple classical difference between  use value and  exchange value , 
which determines the opportunities of a transaction. Compared to 
Hohfeld, Commons’s aim was also to emphasize transactions taking 
place within organizations (managerial transactions) and the role of 
the political administrative authority in allocating resources (ration-
ing transactions). His end was to describe property as a social cre-
ation, a legal construct that can be adapted and modified, so property 
is embedded in social and legal relations in which power and author-
ity are also relevant. In this way, Commons includes some element of 
administrative control in his legal positions. 36 The resulting frame-
work is basically conflict-ridden and based on imperfect opposites 
that never coincide perfectly, such as right-duty, exposure-liberty, 
power-liability, and immunity-disability. 
 To each legal attribute of A, some corresponding position of B 
determines a relationship of limits and reciprocation. To this recip-
rocal interaction, Commons adds the state and the two respective 
“opportunity costs” of supply and demand of respectively individual 
C and D (the next best alternatives to A and B). Therefore, a transac-
tion is a multilateral form of relationship. It involves the decision to 
reciprocally modify rights, often compensated by money (which is 
itself a specific right on a symbolic accounting unit), and consists of 
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a consensual modification of the juridical spheres of the parts under 
the framework of customs, rules, and institutions. 
 Laws and working rules, constituted by practices and customs, 
integrate this framework. Actually, rules and institutions contribute 
to define the legal position and, at the same time, govern the dynam-
ics of the transaction: rules affect rights. Therefore, rules and rights 
are complementary in defining the legal environment. Commons par-
ticularly focuses on institutions and laws that are under the control 
of the government because he is interested in how society is steered 
politically by modifying the legal positions of actors. 37 However, he 
includes working rules resulting from social interactions, such as cus-
toms and habits, among the institutions affecting exchange, leaving 
room for our analysis (specifically, Commons talks of legal, moral, 
and economic sanctions). 
 The transaction is also the framework in which the process of  evalu-
ation takes place, a process “oriented” by institutions, specifically the 
working rules defining the respective entitlements. 38 Institutionalism 
stresses the role of  social evaluation instead of evaluation based on 
the simple market process of neoclassical economics. Social evalua-
tion is affected by the complexity of relationships and by the specific 
arrangement of institutions and also underlines the role of individual 
positions, particularly wealth, in affecting outcomes. Therefore, this 
view supports our double channel including recognition of rights and 
prices. 
 Commons in this way reaffirms the distinction between  freedom 
and  liberty : the latter presupposes a legal framework and a legal capac-
ity of the subject to be able to hold rights and duties. Therefore, 
liberty cannot be defined without considering the respect of each 
right. 
 Rights, the Law, and Evaluation: Giving 
Priority to Social Law 
 Commons’s transaction framework can be expanded to highlight the 
development of effective rights through reciprocal recognition and 
their effect on the distributional outcome in exchanges. The specific 
act of reciprocal recognition among individuals is the fundamental 
and effective foundation of their interactions. Therefore, a right is 
an issue of reciprocal communication and agreement in a structured 
legal environment, and not a simple static tradable element. In this 
way, rights emerge and are defined in a transactional process and not 
a simple input to it. The element underlined here is that the cognitive 
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process of recognition underlies any economic and social interaction; 
it affects the legal positions of players and, as such, has an impact on 
the economic outcomes of the transaction. 
 On the other hand, there are different kinds of rights and rules 
that enter transactions. This perspective of the right as a moral power 
in a relationship implies a further theoretical aspect: it is not possible 
to sharply separate the property right from other kind of rights and 
liberties (as in the classical idea of property). This fact is evident in a 
service economy where the willingness to pay of buyers depends on 
a variety of qualitative factors. The literature normally distinguishes 
human rights from social rights and economic rights. Human rights 
tend to be generally acknowledged by international institutions, and 
many constitutions state a variety of social rights for their citizens. 
Economic rights are more controversial, with the notable exception 
of property. 39 However, the approach taken here is that constitutions 
and formal laws are relevant, but effective rights, obligations, and lib-
erties depend on the specific recognition between individuals. 
 Property is (part of) the set of entitlements of a person. The fact 
that property is tradable does not make it completely autonomous 
from other obligations attached to it or to the whole personality of the 
holder. Property can be complex and involve specific duties (such as 
maintenance, safety, externalities, and common benefits). Therefore, 
the personality of a trader, the set of her entitlements, and even the 
quantity of her endowments, all affect the outcome of the evaluation 
process concerning the specific right traded (property of a good or 
the labor of the individual). It is not only relative scarcity that affects 
prices, but also the status of the interacting persons as well as specific 
context variables. 
 Economic rights are not limited to property, but involve all entitle-
ments of the exchanging parties, including the effective competences 
of the individuals, their reputation, formal certification of compe-
tences, and so forth. They can involve immunities (such as from 
externalities), freedoms, powers, and responsibilities. There are also 
entitlements arising as an effect of the working rules, such as the 
way of granting the performance, incentives to comply with agreed 
performance, or the penalties applied in case of unsatisfactory perfor-
mance—briefly, all points normally included in contracts. 
 What is relevant here is that social and human rights can also factor 
into the interaction, especially when engaging low-pay work. Human 
and social rights can interact with the economic, such as in the case of 
slavery, which reduces also the economic rights of the slaves. Ethnic 
minorities are discriminated against in many ways including the 
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economic point of view, and women often get wages or salaries that 
are significantly lower than that of men. This kind of interaction is 
often analyzed under the label of “discrimination.” The fact is that 
very strong rights of one part opposed to the weakness of the other 
in a transaction can reinforce the former’s power and create a sort of 
liability in the counterpart, making the transaction less “horizontal.” 
That can have monetary implications, in particular when prejudices 
and the consequent distortion of recognition becomes shared in a 
community. 
 A specific problem that can be studied is how the insufficient 
recognition of the juridical position of the counterpart leads to 
downplay her assets in the process of evaluation. This means that 
the process of evaluation—fixing individual reservation prices—is 
affected by the underlying process of recognition of the counterpart. 
Buyers faced with weak counterparts tend to define lower reserva-
tion prices, and sellers, when they are not recognized for what they 
are and deserve, also tend to feel compelled to fix lower reservation 
prices. Independently of the relative scarcity on the market (if the 
market exists), the emerging price would be lower than that coming 
out a situation of equal partners. If we consider our partner an infe-
rior being, our reservation price for anything she can sell us is lower 
than the standard; the opposite when we deal with somebody we 
consider a prestigious person. 
 This process can worsen into a backward feedback when the 
expected lack of recognition leads to expected low evaluation inducing 
individuals to adopt low-profile strategies. For example, people may 
not study because they expect that the eventual title would not assure 
them proportional recognition, which can entrap people in lower 
qualifications. The reverse can also take place: the act of evaluating a 
specific property in a transaction can indirectly affect the respect for 
other rights of the individual, including human rights. The typical 
example is that of a salary that is too low to ensure a decent life for the 
worker. Even if that kind of labor is abundant, the pay should not be 
so low as to harm the worker’s human rights. From this perspective, 
low pay is equivalent to insulting the person. Therefore, recognition 
affects the distribution of income (and perhaps also redistribution 
through the political recognition of social groups). 40 
 The consequence is that, in order to increase the fairness of 
exchanges, we need a policy able to foster the juridical position as well 
as the social position of people in weak positions or with weak entitle-
ments. Moreover, some counterbalancing intervention can also help 
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in equalizing the situation. The most typical example is the diffusion 
of education and literacy at the end of the nineteenth century that 
had the effect of reducing poverty. Today, we can single out the prob-
lem of migrants, whose situation requires an active policy to ensure a 
balanced position in transactions. 
 Rights can be defined and enforced by the constitution and by for-
mal laws, but their origin and their effective definition and respect are 
the result of social interaction. Classic natural law sees natural rights 
as the product of a universal moral law that induces individuals to 
respect other people’s positions in a reciprocal dimension. But reality 
shows the existence of relevant discrimination, and as a consequence, 
universal moral law does not necessarily grant equality. It remains 
useful to analyze actual situations as well, because they can be a point 
of reference for government policies. 
 Commons shaped the concept of transactions to include state 
authority as an essential condition of exchanges. At this point, some 
insights supplied by Dworkin are particularly useful. The state and 
other institutions are responsible for defining background rights, 
which constitute the standard that should be respected and define 
the respect that individuals deserve and are obliged to observe. Such 
rights should be derived from an idea of progress and improvement of 
civil society guided by shared ideal principles that can also be derived 
from philosophy, ideology, or religion. Education is the main policy 
that can be enacted in this regard. As a consequence, the definition of 
rights is not given by a static reciprocity, but rather is part of an evolv-
ing juridical framework in which the law has both to acknowledge 
people’s values and assure a shared direction. The state should there-
fore assume an ethical role because it assumes the task of impressing a 
direction to the juridical evolution through democratic processes. 41 
 The second kind of intervention inspired by Dworkin is designed 
to balance specific institutional rights. Similarly to what nineteenth-
century Jesuit Luigi Taparelli argued, there is some need to counter-
balance the different weight of persons in order to obtain balanced 
transactions. 42 This intervention can be performed by institutions 
that, affecting transactions, are able to reinforce the rights of weak 
categories of people (such as workers, women, or migrants). This is 
the case in favor of labor legislation that helps reinforce the position 
of laborers relative to employers. Consequently, contrary to the lib-
eral argument that liberalization increases efficiency, labor protection 
legislation can display positive results in economic systems suffering 
from insufficient respect of labor rights. 
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 Conclusion: Commutative Justice 
in Economic Interactions 
 The problem of social justice cannot be fully adequately tackled by 
state-centered theories that frame this problem as a purely distributive 
problem. The consequence of such theoretical frame is to surrender to 
any commutative injustice in the name of presumed market efficiency 
and to charge the state and other institutions of solving the insur-
mountable problems of increasing inequality. This is the theoretical 
limit of the perspective of L é on Walras, John Stuart Mill, and, more 
recently, John Rawls. As argued by Axel Honneth, the procedural 
perspective cannot help much avoiding this underevaluation. 43 He 
therefore adds a “justice of needs” and a “justice of performance” (in 
connection with labor remuneration) to the “procedural” to achieve 
an effective social justice. 
 In this chapter, I have used the concept of recognition to argue 
that the problem of social injustice primarily arises in the market 
from some unavoidable processes of unfair evaluation in which weak 
people are progressively set apart. Therefore, there is a serious prob-
lem of social evaluation in the market that is not purely economic 
but that social economists cannot avoid analyzing. The spontaneous 
emergence of norms, habits, and opinions is a fundamental aspect of 
human interaction. It acquires an important role in economic interac-
tions in which it represents the most effective legal element. However, 
it can also have shortcomings and some negative impact by preserving 
or increasing inequalities that certainly are not functional to a fair 
functioning of the market. 
 In this framework, we can see that the historical role of social and 
labor legislation was not to reduce inequalities by redistributing wealth 
(that was theorized mostly by the current liberal-progressive trend in 
economics). Rather, the primary role of this legislation was to rein-
force the juridical position of contracting parties in the market, ensur-
ing in this way a result closer to commutative justice. Contemporary 
reformers, busy in dismantling past institutions, apparently disregard 
this fundamental aspect. 44 
 Notes 
 1.  Practical here means “with a view to decision and action”; see Finnis, 
 Natural Law and Natural Rights , 12. 
 2.  The pragmatic background of institutionalism also shares some epis-
temological aspects of the classic practical approach. 
 3.  Hanfling, “Rights and Human Rights,” 63. 
9781137444301_04_c03.indd   54 12/27/2014   6:00:58 PM
A LEGAL APPROACH TO SOCIAL ECONOMICS 55
 4.  We refer in particular to John Commons’s early study,  The Distribution 
of Wealth , and to the paper “Institutional Economics.” 
 5.  See the studies of Tuck,  Natural Rights Theories ; Reid, “The 
Canonistic Contribution to the Western Rights Tradition”; and 
Tierney,  The Idea of Natural Rights . 
 6.  The  Magna Carta Libertatum of 1215 had an explicit defensive char-
acter and in part some individualist dimension. It had an important 
impact on the conception of eventual theorization of law. In the feu-
dal world, any autonomy in the use of property was achieved thanks 
to “privileges” assured by the emperor or king. 
 7.  The idea of  Ordo survived in the German economic studies up to 
 Ordo-Liberalism . 
 8.  See Schlatter,  Private Property. 
 9.  See Shue,  Basic Rights . 
 10.  This idea has also shaped the form of twentieth-century welfare 
states developed out of the universalist principles theorized in the 
Beveridge Report in 1942. Universalism is achieved by state’s supply 
of adequate public services and, in particular, by the  decommodifica-
tion of some service. In fact, some social rights (such as the right to 
health) have found some implementation following the same path 
that property rights took for implementation: by letting the state pro-
vide a specific service or guarantee. 
 11.  Here, I refer to Rawls’s  Political Liberalism that updates his book  A 
Theory of Justice. 
 12.  See, in particular, Habermas, “Politischer Liberalismus”; and 
Honneth, “Das Gewerbe der Gerechtigkeit.” 
 13.  Legal positivism presumes that the law is the result of explicit social 
practices and institutional decisions. 
 14.  The  unity of value argument is particularly developed in Dworkin, 
 Justice for Hedgehogs. Dworkin defines “ethics” as the study of how 
to live well and “morals” as the study of how we should treat the 
others. 
 15.  In  Taking Rights Seriously , Dworkin discussed rights to equal con-
sideration and respect and argued that there is no trade-off between 
liberty rights and equality rights; in other words, there is no general 
right to freedom. 
 16.  Those who start the theorization of rights from the individual have 
difficulties proceeding to an operational political-economic theori-
zation, and they tend to crowd out social law in favor of top-down 
reforms. Joseph Raz, in  The Morality of Freedom , also tends to follow 
this direction. 
 17.  Many scholars found the idea of rights in the principle of human 
dignity or human needs. The latter principles are certainly useful in 
theory but they remain vague in practice. 
 18.  See Scanlon,  What We Owe to Each Other . 
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 19.  Hanfling, “Rights and Human Rights,” 62. 
 20.  See Gewirth, “Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights” and  The 
Community of Rights. 
 21.  See Sen, “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights.” 
 22.  Sen affirms that while rights involve claims, freedoms are primarily 
descriptive characteristics of the conditions of persons (ibid., 328). 
Martha Nussbaum, in “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements,” 
on the other hand, tends to see the freedom perspective as too vague. 
Moreover, some freedoms limit others. Therefore, she sees the capa-
bility perspective as complementing the approach based on rights. 
 23.  On Burke’s philosophy, see Harris, “Edmund Burke.” 
 24.  Concerning Hegel, we follow the path of Honneth in  The Struggle for 
Recognition and  Suffering from Indeterminacy , as well as the insights 
of Ver Eecke,  Ethical Dimensions of the Economy. On Rosmini, see 
Hoevel,  The Economy of Recognition . In the theory of Honneth, rec-
ognition is something we should struggle for; in Rosmini it is a natu-
ral attitude that does not lead to a transcendent “we” as in Hegel. 
In this way, to Rosmini, the right to property is at the same time 
personal, interpersonal, and social. (The first modern philosopher of 
recognition was Rousseau, but there is no specific revival of him; see 
Neuhouser,  Rousseau’s Theory of Self-Love .) 
 25.  See Rosmini,  Principles of Ethics . 
 26.  See Hoevel,  The Economy of Recognition , 103. 
 27.  See Rosmini,  The Philosophy of Right (both volumes). 
 28.  We see this in the Kantian scheme as well; for instance, see White, 
 Kantian Ethics and Economics. 
 29.  See Hegel,  Philosophy of Right. 
 30.  Hertel and Minkler’s edited volume  Economic Rights provides vari-
ous categories that can be used in the analysis. 
 31.  See Tusset,  Money as Organisation ; refer also to Hermann, 
 Staatswirtschaftliche Untersuchungen ; and Macleod,  Principles of 
Economical Philosophy . For the work of Del Vecchio, see  Ricchezze 
immateriali e capitali immateriali . 
 32.  See B ö hm-Bawerk,  Rechte und Verh ä ltnisse vom Standpunkte der 
volkswirthschaftlichen G ü terlehre . The influence of B ö hm-Bawerk on 
Commons is presented in Fiorito, “John R. Commons, Wesley N. 
Hohfeld, and the Origins of Transactional Economics.” It is not clear 
how much inspiration Commons received from the work of Macleod. 
Consequently, the idea of basing the study of economic processes 
on transactions owes to the German economy both the use of ideal-
types and the relational approach. 
 33.  See Commons,  The Distribution of Wealth . 
 34.  See Hohfeld,  Fundamental Legal Conceptions . 
 35.  In particular, see Commons, “Law and Economics.” For what 
concerns the legal elements entering production, Commons (in 
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 The Distribution of Wealth ) singles out personal abilities, capital, 
monopoly privileges, and legal rights. 
 36.  See Fiorito, “John R. Commons, Wesley N. Hohfeld, and the Origins 
of Transactional Economics.” 
 37.  See Commons, “Law and Economics” and “Institutional Economics.” 
 38.  On the process of social evaluation, see Tool, “A Social Value Theory 
in Neoinstitutional Economics.” 
 39.  See Hertel and Minkler,  Economic Rights. 
 40.  See the exchange between Honneth and Margalit in “Recognition.” 
 41.  The problem of stating what is the just thing in the classical tradition 
is solved by assuming an external point of view to be able to study the 
balance of positions. 
 42.  His thought on the point is resumed in Mastromatteo and Solari, 
“Jesuits and Italian Unification.” 
 43.  See Honneth, “Das Gewerbe der Gerechtigkeit.” 
 44.  I am indebted to Daniel Finn, Kevin McCarron, and Robert E. 
Prasch for comments on the first draft of this work. 
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